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The emergency of mutual cooperation is studied in a spatially extended evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma
game in which the players are located on the sites of cubic lattices for dimensions d = 1, 2 and 3. Each player
can choose one of the three following strategies: cooperation (C), defection (D) or Tit for Tat (T ). During
the evolutionary process the randomly chosen players adopt one of their neighboring strategies if the chosen
neighbor has higher payoff. Moreover, an external constraint imposes that the players always cooperate
with probability p. The stationary state phase diagram is computed by both using generalized mean-field
approximations and Monte Carlo simulations. Nonequilibrium second order phase transitions associated with
the extinction of one of the possible strategies are found and the corresponding critical exponents belong
to the directed percolation universality class. It is shown that forcing externally the collaboration does not
always produce the desired result.
PACS numbers: 02.50.-r, 05.50.+q, 87.23.Cc
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary game theory has attracted a lot atten-
tion during the past years [1,2] in human sciences, polit-
ical sciences, biology and economics. In particular, the
so-called evolutionary prisoner’s dilemma game (PDG),
which is a metaphor for the evolution of cooperation in
populations of selfish individuals, has been minutely in-
vestigated [1–5]. In the original form of the PDG, only
uniform populations with given strategies were consid-
ered. However, it was realized [1,6] that new interesting
phenomena can occur when the PDG was expanded in
such a way that local contests in a d-dimensional space
could take place (we shall use the abbreviation SPDG for
such systems). It turns out that these spatially extended
models are similar to the ones studied in nonequilibrium
statistical physics. They may exhibit cooperative behav-
ior resulting in phase transitions in the stationary state.
Accordingly, it is very fruitful to study SPDG like models
using the tools developed in the framework of nonequi-
librium statistical physics.
In its simpler form, the PDG is a version of matrix
games where the symmetric incomes of the two players
depend on their simultaneous decisions, whether they
wish to cooperate with the others or to defect. Each
player wants to maximize his individual income. The
highest individual payoff (the temptation to defect) can
be reached by the defector against the cooperator re-
ceiving the lowest reward (sucker’s payoff). The mutual
cooperation results in the highest total payoff divided
equally between the players. For mutual defections the
players get a lower payoff exceeding the value of sucker’s
payoff. Two rational players will both defect because
this choice provides the larger income independently of
the partner’s choice.
On the contrary, mutual cooperation dominates in eco-
nomic and biological systems where the contestants in-
teract frequently. In the iterated round-robin PDG, the
players, knowing the previous decisions, have to choose
between two options (defection and cooperation). For a
given round the contestants can be classified according
to the total individual payoffs they have obtained. Fol-
lowing the Darwinian selection principle, at each round
the worst player will adopt the winner’s strategy.
Extended numerical simulations have been performed
to select the “best strategy” among many [4,7]. Best
does not means that this strategy will always win a fight
against another strategy, but means that it will obtain
the highest payoff during a tournament during which it
will have to fight against many opponents having differ-
ent strategies. In [4] the highest payoff was obtained by
the so-called ”Tit for Tat” (T ) strategy which cooper-
ates in the first round and then always repeats his co-
player’s previous decision. The main characteristics of
this strategy (never defect first, react to the defection of
the opponent and forgiveness) are crucial ingredients to
sustain the mutual cooperation against the defectors. In
particular, extensive simulations (see [3] for a summary)
for the case in which the players adopt one of the two
following strategies: C (cooperate unconditionally) or D
(defect unconditionally) have shown that the cooperators
were disappearing in the stationary state. The introduc-
tion of some T ’s strategies has an important effect. For
short times, the D’s population increases while the C’s
one decreases, leading to the decrease of D’s payoffs. As
a consequence, the T’s can invade the D’s population.
In order to study the spatial effects Nowak and May [6]
have introduced an SPDG consisting of a two-state cel-
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lular automaton. The players are located on a regular
lattice in a d-dimensional space and can adopt the C’s or
D’s strategy. Each player is fighting with the individuals
belonging to a given neighborhood. The player’s strate-
gies are upgraded simultaneously in discrete time steps
according to the following rule: each player adopts the
best strategy found in his neighborhood. This model ex-
hibits a rich variety of spatial and temporal patterns as a
function of the payoff b characterizing the temptation to
defect. Other SPDG models have also been investigated
[8–10]. In particular Killingback and Doebeli [11] have
shown that “Pavlov” like strategies can be even more
efficient than “Tit for Tat” in some circumstances.
Nowak et al. [12] have also extended the above analysis
by allowing stochasticity (irrational choices) during the
evolutionary process. The degree of stochasticity is gov-
erned by a parameter called m, and in the limit m→∞,
one recovers the deterministic case. According to the
value of b, several stationary states are possible.
In some related models [13], Szabo´ and To˝ke have
shown that the different stationary state phases were sep-
arated by second order nonequilibrium phase transitions
lines. The associated critical exponents belongs to the
directed percolation (DP) universality class [13,14].
Both the importance of the presence of the T’s in
the PDG and the richness associated with the spatially
extended aspect motivated us to study a new class of
SPDG. In the present work, we study a novel aspect of
the SPDG, namely what is happening when the cooper-
ators are enforced by some external constraints. More
explicitly, we consider a SPDG with the three strategies
D, C, and T and investigate the effects of random adop-
tion (or forcing) of C strategies. This new effect can be
interpreted as an attempt by a government or by any
other organization to enforce the cooperation among in-
dividuals by forcing some of them, chosen randomly with
a given probability p, to cooperate. A different interpre-
tation can also be given. Among the player’s community,
some old players resign and are replaced by younger ones
having a different educational background making them
more open to collaborate. As we shall see the effects of
this external constraint are rather surprising. Indeed, in
dimensions 1,2 or 3, the presence of the constraint re-
duces the cooperation if p is less than a given threshold
value pc depending upon the dimensionality of the sys-
tem. The cooperation is enforced only if the constraint
is strong enough, i.e. if p > pc.
The nonequilibrium second order phase transitions de-
scribing the extinction of one of the possible strategies are
found to belong to the directed percolation universality
class.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is defined
in section II. Its properties are analyzed in mean-field
approximation in section III. The properties of the model
without constraint are discussed in section IV. The model
with constraint is studied in section V, both in mean-field
approximation and by Monte Carlo (MC) simulations, for
respectively 1, 2 and 3 dimensions. Finally, conclusions
are drawn in section VI.
II. THE MODEL
We consider a SPDG model in which the players are
located on the sites of a d-dimensional cubic lattice of
linear size L where periodic boundary conditions are as-
sumed. Each player can adopt one of the three following
strategies D (defects), C (cooperates) or T (Tit for Tat)
and interacts with its 2d nearest neighbors. The total
payoff of a given player is the sum of the payoffs coming
from the interaction with all its nearest neighbors. We
use an extension (including the Tit for Tat strategy) of
the payoff matrix used by Nowak and May [6]. The in-
dividual payoffs for the players P1 and P2 as a function
of their strategies are given in Table 1. The only free pa-
rameter b (1 < b < 2) measures the temptation to defect.
Note that the above payoff matrix does not take into ac-
count that the T players always try to cooperate with
D’s during the first round. Thus these values are consid-
ered as the averaged (or in this present case stabilized)
payoffs.
P1 \ P2 D C T
D 0 \ 0 b \ 0 0 \ 0
C 0 \ b 1 \ 1 1 \ 1
T 0 \ 0 1 \ 1 1 \ 1
Table 1: Payoff matrix of the model
It is legitimate to use this payoff matrix providing that
the strategy adoption is rare comparing to the frequency
of the game. It makes the simulation simpler and more
efficient. Notice that similar payoff matrices can be ob-
tained when substituting some other “nice” strategy (as
Pavlov which cooperates in the first round for example,
a strategy which is nevertheless less efficient than T in
this case) [3,4] for T .
For the non constrained case (p = 0), the system
evolves in discrete time according to the following MC
process. Starting from a random initial state, a site is
chosen randomly. This site updates its strategy by first
selecting randomly one of its nearest neighbor and sec-
ond, by adopting the strategy of this nearest neighbor
only if it is having a higher payoff. A MC steps consists
in updating each lattice site once, on the average.
In the constrained case, at each time step, each player
is forced to adopt the cooperative strategy C with a prob-
ability p.
Thus the dynamics of the constrained model is the fol-
lowing.
• One chooses randomly one player.
• With probability p this player adopts the C strat-
egy.
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• With probability (1 − p) the player searches for
a better strategy according to the procedure de-
scribed above.
• The players update their payoffs.
The model is characterized by three free parameters:
b, p, d.
It is hopeless to find exact analytical solutions for such
models. Accordingly, we shall first study them in the
framework of mean-field like approximations and then
investigate them by numerical simulations.
III. MEAN-FIELD LIKE APPROXIMATIONS
The simplest mean-field approximation consists in ne-
glecting all the spatial correlations in the systems. This
amount to consider a model in which for each player,
the partners are chosen randomly in the system instead
of being restricted to a particular neighborhood. Each
player interacts with the same number of counterparts.
The dimensionality of the system plays no role. The sim-
plest mean-field like approximations have been success-
fully used previously for similar problems and more de-
tails concerning this approximative scheme can be found
in textbooks [1,2,5].
Within this approximation, the dynamics of the system
is completely described by the time dependent concentra-
tions:
cα(t) = 〈Nα(t)〉/L
d, (α = C,D, T ) (1)
where Nα(t) is the number of players with strategy α at
time t. These concentrations satisfy the normalization
condition cD + cC + cT = 1.
According to Table 1 the average payoffs for each strat-
egy are:
mD = bcC , mC = cC + cT , mT = cC + cT . (2)
Notice that the C and T strategies have the same payoffs,
therefore no strategy exchange will occur among them.
Following the evolutionary rules given in Sec. II, the
concentrations cα(t) obey the following equations of mo-
tion:
c˙D = −pcD ∓ (1− p)cD(cC + cT ) ,
c˙C = +p(cD + cT )± (1− p)cDcC , (3)
c˙T = −pcT ± (1− p)cDcT ,
where the upper and lower signs refer respectively to the
cases when strategy D is dominated by C and T ( mD <
mC = mT ), and when D dominates C and T (mD >
mC = mT ).
The numerical integration of the above equations of
motions leads, for several values of p, to the flow diagrams
shown in Fig. 1.
The quantities represented on the vertical and hori-
zontal axes are respectively cD and cC − cT . The upper
corner of the triangle corresponds to the state of cD = 1,
while the lower left and right corners describe respec-
tively homogeneous states with cT = 1 and cC = 1.
p=0.6
-1 0 1
cC-cT
p=0.2
p=0
cD1
FIG. 1. Trajectories in the two-dimensional phase space
for three different values of p as indicated in the figures. The
dashed lines divide the phase spaces into two regions: on their
left (right) hand side the payoff of the D strategy is lower
(higher) than those of the C and T ones.
For 0 < p < 1/2 the stationary state solution of the
above equations is:
cD =
1− 2p
1− p
; cC =
p
1− p
; cT = 0 (4)
while for p > 1/2 the system goes to the adsorbing state
(cC = 1 and cD = cT = 0). Surprising the T strategy
extincts if p > 0.
Without constraints, i.e. for p = 0, the system tends
either to a homogeneous D adsorbing state (cD = 1) or
to a mixed state of C and T strategies (cD = 0) de-
pending on the initial conditions. Note that the above
stationary states are independent of the value of b. Strik-
ingly different behaviors will be observed beyond this
simplest mean-field approximation when the local fluc-
tuations and short-range correlations are taken into ac-
count as we shall see in the following sections.
More elaborated mean-field like approximations can be
devised. The basic idea is to take explicitly into account
some of the spatial correlations by computing the prob-
ability of appearance of all the possible configurations
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of a small cluster containing n sites. In one dimension,
one considers a cluster of n consecutive lattice sites. The
equations of motion for these probabilities follows from
the evolution rules of the system. Details concerning
the one-dimensional case are given in [15]. Note that
already the one site mean-field approximation (n = 1)
differs from the simple mean-field solution given above.
In higher dimensions pair or square mean-field like ap-
proximations have been used, and a detailed description
of these methods can be found in [13,16]. Note that
now, the predictions of these approximations depends
upon the dimension of the system. Accordingly, the cases
d = 1, 2 and 3 will be discussed in different subsections.
IV. MODEL WITHOUT EXTERNAL
CONSTRAINT
Let us start by considering the case with no external
constraint, i.e. p = 0. In this case, the dynamic is simple:
a given player adopts the strategy of one of his randomly
chosen neighbor providing that this neighbor has a higher
payoff. As we shall see, the only stationary states are
either always trivial cooperator like (C or C-T ) or a pure
defector one (D).
When the random initial state is made of only coop-
erators and defectors, one founds that, both in d = 1, 2
and 3 dimensions, the stationary state of the system is a
pure defector one.
The reason in d = 1 is simply that a D player has
always a higher payoff than a neighboring C player.
In d = 2 several configurations should be analyzed.
The most favorable situation for C to win is when it is
adjacent to a flat C-D interface. However, if this interface
has an irregularity then the D’s can invade the sea of C
players. Indeed, a new born C in the D half-plane is
always weaker than the D’s at the interface and thus,
such C’s disappears sooner or later. However, at a given
time and with some finite probability, two next nearest
neighbor C players could be present in the D half-plane.
It results a payoff 3b for the D player squeezed between
three C and this D can now invade the C’s and sweep off
one layer of them independently of the value of b.
The d = 3 case is very similar, but the process is slower.
Indeed, four nearest neighbors of a D player (called D1)
are necessary to be invaded by the C’s if the value of b is
close to 1. Once it has occured, D1 is strong enough to
cross the interface and then destroys all the C’s.
For a large system with initially a finite proportion
of T players, the stationary state is always a cooperator
like state (T -C). This asymptotic behavior can be easily
understood in the one dimensional case. Let us suppose
that there are four neighboring T (TTTT ) in the initial
state of a 1d system, (this is practically always the case
in a sufficiently large system with a finite probability to
have some T ’s in the initial state), then they kill all of the
D’s. Even in the worst case two D’s could invade into to
the T population, (CDDTTDDC), but then the central
T ’s become stronger (payoff=1) then the D’s (payoff=0).
The D’s kill all of the neighboring C’s, and even these
two T ’s can invade the whole D area.
This argument can be extended to d dimensions. A
cube of linear size 4, made of T players is enough to
guarantee the cooperation in the stationary state. The
reason is that the D’s surrounding this cube cannot de-
stroy the central T players inside a cube of linear size 2.
Indeed, the central T ’s have always d T ’s neighbors to
cooperate with (payoff=d), but the neighboring D’s can
only have one C neighbor (payoff≤ b < d if d ≥ 2).
V. MODEL WITH EXTERNAL CONSTRAINT
We now consider the case in which the players are lo-
cated on the sites of a d-dimensional cubic lattice in the
presence of an external constraint imposing to each player
to choose the C strategy with probability p. The cases
d = 1, 2 and 3 will be considered.
A. One-dimensional system
In the one-dimensional model the players located on
the sites of a chain interact with their two nearest neigh-
bors. It is easy to see that the dynamics is independent
of the value of the parameter b in its domain of definition.
A systematic MC analysis of the stationary states was
performed by varying the value of p for different system
sizes between L = 32 to L = 16384. Our simulations
show that the T’s strategy extincts for all values of p.
However, as a function of p, the stationary state can be
either a symbiosis of C and D strategies or a pure C state
as shown in Fig. 2. For very small values of p, one has a
pure C stationary state (cC = 1) but, when p reaches the
value p1, a first transition occurs to a stationary state in
which the two strategies D and C coexist. At p = pc2 >
p1 the system undergoes a second continuous transition
from the C-D stationary state to the pure absorbing C
state.
The transition at pc2 is easy to understand. In one
dimension and when only C and D strategies are present
our model is equivalent to the contact process (CP)
which was originally introduced as a simple model for
epidemics [17]. In the CP a particle (sick person) can
disappear at rate 1, and an empty site (healthy person)
can become occupied with rate λz/2, where λ is the con-
trol parameter and z is the number of particles in the
neighborhood of the empty site. In our model the D
strategy, which in d = 1 is always better than the C
one, plays the role of the sick persons and the C strat-
egy, which can only be created in the system through the
constraint, corresponds to the healthy individuals.
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0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3
p
0.0
0.5
1.0
c D
FIG. 2. The concentration of strategy D as a function of
p in the one-dimensional system. The open squares are the
MC data obtained for L = 16384. The solid lines represent
the results of n-point approximations (n = 1, ..., 7 from right
to left).
Starting from a C-D-T initial state and after the ex-
tinction of T ’s the possible stationary states are the pure
C or a C-D states. The C-D state corresponds to the
steady state of the CP as well. For p around pc2, the T ’s
disappear rapidly and thus do not affect the extinction
of the D’s. Hence the second transition to the absorbing
state corresponds to the CP’s one. This transition oc-
curs at pc2 = 1/(1+λc) = 0.23267 [18] and is believed to
belong to the DP universality class [19,20].
0
0.5
1
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1
ρ
p
FIG. 3. The probability, ρL(p), of reaching the C-D state
for different system sizes (from right to left L = 50, 100,
200, 500, 1000, 2000, 5000, 10000 and the interpolation for
L = ∞). The dotted lines represent a fit described in the
text.
The behavior of the first transition at small p’s is much
less clear. It turns out that for our model two characteris-
tic parameters pα(L) and pβ(L), depending on the system
size L, can be introduced. For p < pα(L) the stationary
state is always the pure C state while for p > pβ(L)
the system evolves to a C-D coexistence phase, which is
a steady state of the CP. For p1(L) < p < p2(L), the
system can evolves towards one of the two possible sta-
tionary states, depending on the particular realization of
the random numbers and on the initial state.
0
0.5
1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
ρ
{p-ρ-1
∞
[ρL(p)]}/L1/3
FIG. 4. The probability ρ as a function of the scaled pa-
rameter. The symbols represents the different system sizes as
in Fig. 3.
The probability, ρL(p), of reaching the C-D state has
been investigated numerically. The data are plotted in
Fig. 3 and can be well fitted by a function of the type
1 − exp(−c1(p − p0)
c2), where c1, c2 and p0 are fitting
parameters. The limiting function ρ∞(p) was obtained
by using usual finite size scaling methods. As shown in
Fig. 4, the functions ρL(p) collapse on a single curve if
one plots ρ as a function of {p− ρ−1
∞
[ρL(p)]}/L
1/3. This
shows that ρ∞(p) do not collapse to zero, hence the phase
transition takes place at a finite value of p ≃ 0.025.
0
5000
10000
15000
0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07
t C
D
,
 
t C
p
FIG. 5. The respective times tC (L = 2000(∗)) and
tCD (L = 200 (+), 500 (×), 2000 (✷)) needed to reach
the C and the C-D stationary states. For comparison,
10000 × ρL=2000(p) is also presented with dotted line.
The respective times tC and tCD needed to reach the
pure C and the C-D stationary states have also been
investigated. Both times show a singular behavior (see
Fig. 5). Unfortunately, we were not able to find a rea-
sonable scaling fit for those data. However, it is obvious
from the simulations, that tCD exhibits a much stronger
singularity than tC . Hence, for a large system, the time
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needed to reach the C-D state is much larger than the one
needed to reach the C state, even if the system evolves
to the C-D state more frequently.
Beside the MC simulations, the properties of the sys-
tem were also investigated using generalized mean-field
approximations. Assuming the coexistence of all the
three strategies these calculations can be performed nu-
merically on clusters of sizes as large as n = 4. Contrary
to the MC results (see Fig. 2) these approximations pre-
dicted the existence of a C-D-T state at small p values.
As far as the T’s are concerned, we observed that the
maximum value of cT is decreasing when the cluster sizes
n were increasing, providing us a trend for the extinction
of the T’s.
The contradiction between the present mean-field and
MC results refers to the importance of (interfacial) inva-
sion phenomena detailed later on.
Allowing only two strategies (C and D) the above
mean-field analysis can be performed for larger cluster
sizes up to n = 7. The results are compared with the MC
ones in Fig. 2. As expected, the accuracy of the general-
ized mean-field method increases with the cluster size n.
The extrapolation of the results obtained for finite values
of n (n = 1, ..., 7) leads to a critical value p
(MF )
c2 ≃ 0.235.
The quality of this approximative scheme can be esti-
mated by comparing the value of p
(MF )
c2 with the best
known numerical value pc2 = 0.23267 [18].
In order to understand the behavior of the model
around the first transition it is interesting to examine
the time evolution of the system in its transient regime.
As illustrated in Fig. 6, one can observe a domain growth
process controlled by cyclic invasions [21]. This picture
suggests that the most relevant aspect of the dynamics
is the collision between the fronts separating different
strategies.
tim
e
FIG. 6. Evolution of strategy distribution for p = 0.04
starting from a random initial state. The k-th row shows
the positions of the D (closed squares), C (empty), and T
(open circle) strategies at the time 2k measured in MC steps.
Let us first investigate the motion of a front separat-
ing a cluster of C from a D one. The D domains contain
some C sites coming from the external constraint. How-
ever, the life times of the C’s are very short [∼ (1 − p)].
Within a D domain the average C concentration is equal
to that of the CP and can be well approximated by the
simple mean-field approach as we have seen above. The
D strategy invades the territory of the C one (absorbing
state). Due to the reflection symmetry the invasion front
can move to the left or to the right with the same abso-
lute value of the velocity. To first order in p in the limit
p→ 0, the absolute value of the average invasion velocity
can be estimated by using the configuration probabilities
given for n = 1. This calculation yields
v =
1− 3p
2
. (5)
Let us now consider the invasion of the T strategy into
the D one. Inside a territory which has been invaded by
the T strategy, the C strategy is setting up with a prob-
ability p. As both C’s and T ’s have the same payoff, no
adaptation of strategies occur between them. Assuming
that this invading front travels with a constant velocity
u, the probability of having a C player at a site k steps
behind the front is 1 − e−pτ(k). τ(k) = (k + 1/2)/u is
the averaged time it takes to the front to move over a
distance of k. Thus, it follows that, to leading order in
p,
u =
1− 11p
2
. (6)
We note that above approximations lead to a velocity
for the D → C front which is larger than the one for
the T → D. This prediction can be compared with the
results of the MC simulations (see Fig. 7). For the D →
C front, the agreement is very good if p < 0.1, while for
the T → D case, the approximation reproduces well only
the linear part near the origin.
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
p
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
u
, 
v
FIG. 7. Velocities of D → C (open squares) and T → D
(diamonds) invasions as a function of p. The solid and dashed
lines indicate the analytical predictions in linear approxima-
tion.
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Another consequence of the external constraint con-
cerns the life-time of the T clusters. According to the
above picture, the probability that a T cluster dyes out
during the time evolution can be approximated by:
PT =
∞∏
k=0
[1− exp(−p(k + 1/2)/u)] . (7)
The inverse of PT can be interpreted as the average life
time τT of an invading T cluster. Substituting an integral
for the infinite sum appearing in the logarithm of the
above expression leads to:
τT ≃ exp(
pi2u
6p
) = exp(pi2
1− 11p
12p
) . (8)
This expression shows a fast increase of the life-time when
p is decreasing. For example, a T cluster dyes out in
about 105 MC steps (MCS) if p = 0.04. This estimated
life-time is significantly larger than those found by MC
simulations [τ
(MC)
T (p = 0.04) ≈ 800 MCS] as indicated
in Fig. 6. The p-dependence of the MC data can be well
approximated by the function τT = 3.26 exp(0.226/p)
within the region 0.025 < p < 0.08 we could study. The
large discrepancy between the mean-field and MC results
refers to the enhanced role of the velocity fluctuations.
Starting from a random initial state spatially sepa-
rated, domains are rapidly formed. Then two different
situations can occur. First, T clusters are present one
both ends of each D clusters leading to a fast extinc-
tion of D’s. Accordingly, the system evolves to a pure
C state. Second, after some time the system reaches a
state characterized by the presence of only one D cluster,
having a T island at only one of its ends, in a sea of C.
As the D → C invasion is faster than the T → D, the T ’s
can never destroy the D’s and due to the finite life-time
of the T cluster the stationary state is a C-D coexisting
one. The exponential increase of the life-time of this T
cluster as p→ 0 explains the singular behavior observed
in tCD.
For p < p1(L) the life-time of the T players are so long
that all the D clusters are surrounded by T ’s. Accord-
ingly, the first scenario described above is always present,
leading to a pure C state. In the contrary, for p > p2(L)
the short lifetime of T ’s insures that the T ’s disappear
rapidly, allowing for the growth of the D clusters. As a
consequence the stationary state is a C-D one.
B. Two-dimensional system
The players are located on the sites of a two-
dimensional square lattice. According to the payoff ma-
trix (see Table 1), two ranges of values of b have now to
be distinguished, namely, 1 < b < 3/2 and 3/2 < b < 2.
For any value of b in one of those ranges the dynamics is
the same.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
p
0.0
0.5
1.0
Co
nc
en
tra
tio
ns
FIG. 8. Stationary state densities of D (closed squares), C
(open circles) and T (open squares) strategies as a function of
p as obtained by MC simulation of a system of size 512× 512
for 3/2 < b < 2. The solid (D), dotted (C) and long-dashed
(T ) lines indicate the predictions of the square mean-field like
approximation.
Let us first consider the simulations performed for
the value 3/2 < b < 2. The situation is summarized
in Fig. 8, in which the stationary values of the strat-
egy concentrations are plotted as a function of p. For
p < p
(MC)
c1 = 0.1329(1), the system reaches a station-
ary state in which the three strategies C,D and T coex-
ist. Here it is worth mentioning, that for small p values
(p <∼ 0.03) the finite system can reach the absorbing state
if the initial state has been chosen randomly. Below this
size-dependent threshold value the three-strategy state
can be formed and sustained by slow decreasing of p dur-
ing the simulation. In this case the extinction of T ’s and
D’s is a consequence of fluctuations (detailed later on)
and the coexistence of the three strategies is considered
as the real stationary state in the limit L→∞. The sim-
ulations performed for p ≥ 0.005 show that cD decreases
linearly with p when p→ 0.
When p
(MC)
c1 < p < p
(MC)
c2 = 0.3671(1) only the strate-
gies C and D survive. Finally, when p > pMCc2 the system
reaches a pure C absorbing state.
The phase diagram obtained by numerical simulations
can be compared with the ones obtained using the ex-
tended mean-field approximation described in Sec. III.
At the level of pair approximation, one finds p
(pair)
c1 =
0.1704 and p
(pair)
c2 = 0.4236, while for the square mean-
field approximation one finds p
(sq)
c1 = 0.1482 and p
(sq)
c2 =
0.3980. These latest results are plotted in Fig. 8. They
compare well with the MC values given above.
Some complementary information can be obtained by
studying the concentration fluctuations defined as:
χα = L
d〈(Nα/L
d − cα)
2〉, (α = C,D, T ) . (9)
When p → 0, the concentration fluctuations χC and χT
are diverging while χD remains regular as shown in Fig. 9.
However, the sizes of the systems investigated were not
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large enough to conclude that χC and χT are diverging
as power laws of p in the limit p→ 0.
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FIG. 9. Concentration fluctuations for the D (closed
squares) and T (open squares) strategies for a 512× 512 sys-
tem.
Moreover, the simulations suggest that for the station-
ary state in which the three strategies coexist, the typical
size of T domains (as well as their persistence time) is
proportional to 1/p. Similar behavior was found in the
forest fire models [22] introduced by Bak et al. [23] to
study the self-organized criticality.
The points pc1 and pc2 are critical points where a sec-
ond order nonequilibrium phase transition takes place.
Indeed, the T concentration vanishes at pc1 as cT ∼
(pc1 − p)
β1 , while the D’s concentration vanishes at pc2
as cD ∼ (pc2 − p)
β2 . In order to justify this behavior
a very careful numerical analysis was performed, using
longer sampling times in the vicinity of critical points.
Fitting the numerical data leads to the above mentioned
values of the critical points and β1 = β2 = 0.57(3) which
is compatible with the directed percolation exponent as
expected on general ground [20]. This fact is confirmed
by the study of concentration fluctuations defined by
Eq. (9). Sharp increases of the concentration fluctuations
are expected at second order phase transitions. Fig. 9 il-
lustrates this point. The concentration fluctuations of C,
D and T strategies behave, near the transition point pc1,
as χ ∼ (pc1−p)
−γ1 with γ1 = 0.37(6). A similar behavior
was found at the transition point pc2 with an exponent
γ2 = 0.37(9). These values are very close to the one of
directed percolation: γDP ≈ 0.35 in two dimensions [20].
The above data suggest that p = 0 is another critical
point. However, for the reasons explained previously, it
was not possible to extract reliable exponents.
It is interesting to analyze how the three strategies
coexist for small values of p. As an example, let us con-
sider the snapshot of the stationary state of a system
with p = 0.04 (see Fig. 10).
FIG. 10. Distribution of defectors (black boxes), coopera-
tors (white area) and Tit for Tat strategies (open squares) in
a system of size 100 × 100, subset of a larger system of size
256× 256 for p = 0.04.
One can observe that ”dark areas” (made of defectors)
are invading the territory (”white areas”) of cooperators,
simultaneously, the ”dark areas” are invaded by the T ac-
tors (open squares). However, the domination of the T ’s
is prevented by the external constraint which is leading
to the growing of C areas within the T territory. When
p decreases, the T territory expands while the growth of
white areas slows down. The dark islands become sparse.
On the contrary, an increase of the value of p accelerates
the spreading of the C areas as well as their occupation by
the defectors. Consequently, the D population increases
with p and the number of T competitors decreases and
vanishes at p = pc1.
As a result of these cyclic dominant processes a self-
organized domain structure is maintained in the system.
Analogous spatio-temporal structures have already been
observed by Satulowsky and Tome´ in a two-dimensional
predator-prey system [16] and by Tainaka and Itoh when
studying competing species [24]. Both models belong to
the family of spatially-extended Lotka-Volterra models
predicting oscillatory behavior of concentrations in the
simple mean-field approximation [25].
One can also analyze the evolution of the typical strat-
egy configurations in the vicinity of the phase transi-
tion taking place at (p = pc1). One recognizes isolated
colonies of the T strategies whose motions remind us of
the branching annihilating random walk models. It is
known that this model belongs to the DP universality
class too [26].
The rate of mutual cooperation is related to the aver-
age payoff per site. The maximum average payoff (which
value is 4) is reached when all the players cooperate with
their neighbors. On the other hand, the minimum aver-
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age payoff per sites coincides with the maximum of D’s
concentration.
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FIG. 11. Average payoff per site sites versus p in the
two-dimensional model. The closed squares represent the MC
data obtained for b = 1.83 and L = 512. The diamonds indi-
cate the quantity 4(cC + cT ).
In Fig. 11 the average payoff per site is compared with
the quantity 4(cC + cT ). One can see that the agreement
between these two quantities is generally reasonable and
is even quite good for p < pc1. The differences between
the two quantities are only coming from the fights taking
place at the boundaries D-C or D-T . However, for this
range of values of p, the D players form clusters due to
the presence of the T ’s and accordingly these fights are
not frequent.
Finally, let us briefly consider the case for which the
parameter b belongs to the second possible range, 1 <
b < 3/2. The results of the simulations are qualitatively
similar to the case 3/2 < b < 2. The critical values of
p are lower, namely, pc1 = 0.112(1) and pc2 = 0.297(1).
The most relevant differences can be observed in the limit
p→ 0, where the maximum concentration of the T strat-
egy is strikingly lower (cT < 0.15) than those reported in
the previous case (see Fig. 8).
C. Three-dimensional system
We now consider the case in which the players are lo-
cated on the sites of a three-dimensional cubic lattice.
According to the payoff matrix (see Table 1), five ranges
of values of b : 1 < b < 2 have now to be distinguished,
separated by the following values: b = 5/4, 4/3, 3/2,
and 5/3. Any value of b in one of those ranges will lead
strictly to the same behavior. Moreover it turns out that
all the values of b : 1 ≤ b ≤ 2 leads qualitatively to the
same behavior.
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FIG. 12. Stationary state densities ofD (closed squares), C
(open circles) and T (open squares) strategies as a function of
p as obtained by MC simulation of a system of size 80×80×80.
The solid (D), dotted (C) and long-dashed (T ) lines indicate
the predictions of the pair approximation.
Figure 12 shows a typical phase diagram which is qual-
itatively similar to the one found for the two-dimensional
model. MC simulations have been performed for systems
of sizes 323, 643 and 803 for five representative values of
b exploring all the different ranges.
When the value of p increases, the system undergoes
two subsequent phase transitions. The critical values of
p vary weakly with b. For example, for 3/2 < b < 2, we
have obtained p
(MC)
c1 = 0.1441(1) and p
(MC)
c2 = 0.4292(5),
while for 1 < b < 3/2, we found p
(MC)
c1 = 0.1512(2) and
p
(MC)
c2 = 0.4130(3). As expected, the vanishing concen-
trations behave near the critical points as a power law
and both transitions belong to the directed percolation
universality class. For b = 1.6, the numerical analysis
of the MC data in the vicinity of the second transition
gives p
(MC)
c2 = 0.4165(2) and β2 = 0.79(4) in good agree-
ment with the corresponding directed percolation value
of β = 0.81(2) [27].
The analysis of the concentration fluctuations χT and
χD in the vicinity of the points p = pc1 and p = pc2
leads to the critical exponent γ = 0.18(8). The large
uncertainty is due to the small extension of the critical
regime (typically |p− pc| ≤ 10
−3). The above value of γ
is compatible with the scaling law for the DP exponents.
As far as mean-field like approximations are concerned,
they are supposed to be better when increasing the num-
ber of nearest neighbors (dimensions). The algebra be-
comes soon very cumbersome therefore our analysis is
restricted to the pair approximation. The results are
given in Fig. 12. One can see that the approximate re-
sults are in good agreement with the MC data but in the
close vicinity of the critical points. Note finally that the
p-dependence of the average payoff is qualitatively sim-
ilar to those found for the two-dimensional model (see
Fig. 11).
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied quantitatively the emergence of coop-
eration in a spatially extended version of the prisoner’s
dilemma game with three possible strategies (coopera-
tion, defection and Tit for Tat) in the absence and pres-
ence of externally enforced cooperation. The players are
distributed on a d-dimensional simple cubic lattice and
their interactions are restricted to nearest neighbors.
In the absence of external constraint the time evolution
is controlled by a local adoption of a neighboring strat-
egy whose introduction is motivated by the Darwinian
selection rule. When starting the simulations with a ran-
dom initial state made of only cooperators and defec-
tors, one founds that, both in d = 1, 2 and 3 dimensions,
the stationary state of the system is a pure defector one.
However, if the T strategy is also present in the initial
state, then the stationary state is dominated by mutual
cooperation.
The external constraint, forcing the players to adopt
the strategy C with probability p, has the following con-
sequences. If only the C and D strategies are present
in the initial state, then the external constraint enforces
the cooperation for all value of p. However, if the three
strategies C,D and T are initially present and if the di-
mensionality of the system is larger than one, then the
external constraint reduces the cooperation maintained
by T for small values of p. The cooperation will be en-
forced only if the constraint is large enough (p > pc1).
These conclusions are reached both from the extended
mean-field analysis and the MC simulations for 2 and 3
dimensional systems. The general features are not af-
fected by the value of b characterizing the temptation to
defect.
Our study confirms the crucial role of the T strategy
which is able to prevent the spreading of defection. The
T strategy, however, dyes out in the one-dimensional sys-
tem as well as in the models for which the simple mean-
field theory is exact.
The above conclusions are in agreement with several
historical facts coming both from the political or eco-
nomical world. For example, it shows that forcing a frac-
tion of the population to cooperate in a naive way (C
strategy) does not improve the overall cooperation in the
society. It is better to educate more individuals in such
a way that they will be able to play the more sophisti-
cated Tit for Tat strategy if one desires to improve the
cooperation.
From a nonequilibrium phase transition point of view,
the above investigations have confirmed that the two sec-
ond order phase transitions associated with the extinc-
tion processes belong to the robust directed percolation
universality class.
Finally we emphasize that similar behavior is expected
for spatially extended Lotka-Volterra like systems with
three (or more) species providing that where one of the
species is externally favored.
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